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COMMENT
THE DISPARITY ISSUE: A CONTEXT FOR THE
GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL DECISION

John]. Costonis*
Transferable development rights programs, while they represent
an important new means of land use regulation, are of unsettled
constitutional validity.

The recent decision of the New York Court

of Appeals in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
upheld such a program restricting the development of the Grand
Central Terminal property and granting its private owner 11011dollar compensation in the form of transferable development rights.
In this Comment, Professor Costonis focuses on the doctrinal sig
nificance of this decision in forging a "middle way" of land use reg
ulation between the paths of police power and eminent domain.

''

T

HE concept of property," Professor Philbrick advised
some years ago, "has never been, is not, and never can

be of definite content."

1

Unnerving and intriguing, his admoni

tion explains why property jurisprudence stubbornly resists the
best efforts of courts, legislators, and scholars to etch the con
cept's dimensions in stone. Each age must reformulate the prem
ises of those preceding it to bring the entitlements of private
ownership into conformity with dominant contemporary values.
No controversy better illustrates the changing conceptions of
property than the recent decision of the New York Court of
Appeals, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
(Grand

Central

Terminal) .2

That decision upheld the city's

power to prevent, without providing dollar compensation, con
struction by the Penn Central Company and its lessee of a 59story, $100 million office building atop the Grand Central Ter
minal.

The decision is important for its immediate result- the

preservation of New York City's best-known landmark building.
But it has larger significance, I believe, in its teachings concern
ing the root entitlements of land ownership today. Chief Judge
Charles Breitel's opinion, written fo.r a unanimous court, both
completes a cycle dating back to the United States Supreme
Court's 1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois College

1959; LL.B., Columbia, 1965.
1 Philbrick,

696 (1938).

Changing

Conceptions of Property in Law,

2 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 12 1,
7
397 N.Y.S.2d 914
U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1977) (77
-444).
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of Law.
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Co.,3 sustaining zoning as an exercise of the p olice power, and
shapes new law for the future, redefining the manner in which
public and private interests in land should be accommodated.
This Comment examines both facets of the Janus-like opinion
within the context of what is here termed the "disparity issue" the discrepancy in protection afforded property values depending
upon whether government reduces them under its police power
or its eminent domain power.

My thesis is that Grand Central

Terminal discards the dichotomy of current law and accepts the
view that for certain types of land use controversies - here la
beled the "disparity genre" - the financial burden of public inter
vention should fall neither solely upon the landowner, as orthodox
police power doctrine would have it, nor upon government, as
established eminent domain principles would dictate. Chief Judge
Breitel achieves this turnabout in two ways: first, by recognizing
that in appropriate instances police power regulation should be
accompanied by a compensatory off set that affords the landowner
an equitable return on his property; 4 and second, by excluding
from the base upon which that return is calculated what he calls
the "social increment" of value, i.e., that accruing to the regu
lated property by virtue of government's activities.5

I. THE DISPARITY ISSUE
The Supreme Court's decision in Euclid sustained govern
ment's power to restrict private land's profitability by zoning in
order to achieve community planning goals. It held that zoning
measures nerther spring the fifth amendment's "taking" trap nor
offend the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantees merely
because a higher rate of return on zoned property would be pos
sible absent the regulation. Landowners must simply accept the
loss in value of their property - in Euclid a reduction from a
market value of $870,000 to a zoned value of $540,000 - as one
of organized society's less happy facts of life.
While Euclid laid the foundation for modern community plan
ning, it also exacerbated the problem of the disparity in the treat
ment accorded landowners depending upon whether their property
value is diminished by the police or the eminent domain power.
Euclid taught that an owner forfeits proi
f t e xpectancies in his
land to the extent that its value is reduced under the police power.
But for measures implemented ·through eminent domain, he re
ceives prompt payment of the complete loss in dollars under the
3

4
5

365 (r926).
4u-r2 infra.
415-18 infra.

272 U.S.
See pp.
See pp.
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"highest and best use" standard. N �ar the s ifting bor er

.
tween "takings" of property and vahd regulation, this disparity
of treatment has been a sou rce o f confusion and controversy ever
since the Euclid decision.
Jn fairness to the Court, the disparity issue was hardly as
visible in 192 6 as it is today.

For one thing, the nature of the

landowner's objection is more compelling at the present time. The
Ambler Realty Company had demanded protection for no less
than the full p rezoning value of its property - which the Court
without un fairness could declare a mere expectancy unprotected
by the Constitution. But landowners today have long since aban
doned that outpost. Conceding government's power to bite de eply
into land's expectancy values, they ask only for some bare mini
mum of postzoning return in their parcels.

Whether they are

entitled to such a minimum and, i f so, how much, are que stions
unresolved by Euclid.
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located

the police and eminent domain powers on different planets.6 Gen
erally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing
public acquisition of private property for improvements that

·

would be available for "public use," literally construed. To the
police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive
task of preventing harmful externalities, a point reflected in the
Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law t o bolster

its support of zoning.7

So long a s suppression of a privaitely

authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public
purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensa
tion whatever. With the p rogressive growth of government's in
volvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has

contracted considerably. Today government often employs em
inent domain interchangeably with o r as a useful comp lement to
the police power - a trend expressly approved in the Supr eme
Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,8 which broadened the

reach of eminent domain's "public u se" test to match that of the
police power's standard o f "public p u rpose."
Finally, the disparity issue was easily overlooked in Euclid
beca�se th : city's zoning scheme squared neatly with the exter
.
nalities
rationale. The plan merely divided the city into various
.
use, height,
and bulk districts in order to minimize potential con� For a more c�mple�e exposition of the views
developed in this and the fol
lowmg paragraph, mcludmg extensive citation
to the pertinent literature and cases,
see Costonis, "Fai r" Compensation and the
Accomm
ntidot es for
odation Power· A
in Land Use Controv ersies, 75 CoLUM
. L. REV. 1021, 1033-46
(19z5) [hereinafter cited as Fair Compensation
].
272 U.S. at 387-88.

Ta k'zng I'!1'passe

th e

8

.

·

348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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fticts (externalities) between neighboring land uses.

I n the Su

preme Court's apt calculus, Ambler's desire to p rofit at the ex
pense of other Euclid property owners counted for very little
against the city' s need to prevent harmful externalities through
comprehensive zoning controls. Because the plan was applicable
citywide and property owners in the same zones as Ambler in
curred identical burdens and benefits, Ambler could hardly object
that it was being singled out to underwrite a community benefit
or otherwise to bear costs that, in fairness, should have fallen on
Euclid's citizenry as a whole.
But let us update the scenario to portray the disparity genre
of land use dispute, a genre that promises to become a staple in
our environmentally conscious age.

Suppose that Ambler's pro

posed land use would not perceptibly harm its neighbors, that
Ambler alone or a small group including Ambler were precluded
from construction because the community wished the property to
remain in the status quo, and, finally, that the return possible on
the existing use were marginal or perhaps even negative. In short,
let us substitute the Penn Central Company for Ambler. As owner
of Grand Central Terminal, a landmark located in an area gen
erally zoned for sixty-story-plus megastructures, Penn Central
seeks the same entitlement as its neighbors to build to these levels
but is denied permission to do so because the good people of New
York City so enjoy its diminutive landmark. With these refine
ments in plot, the disparity issue, which seemed a bit player in
Euclid, strides conspicuously to center stage demanding the atten

tion of legislatures and judges alike.
I I . THE NEED FOR A "MIDDLE WAY"
Recounting the principal questions that must be addressed to
resolve the disparity issue both strengthens the case for seeking a
"middle way" and exposes the risks that attend the quest. These
questions, as I see it, are five. First, is it the case, as the loose
language of innumerable zoning opinions implies, that overregula
tion is a "taking," hence remediable exclusively through emin�nt
domain proceedings ? 9 Aren't enactments that exceed the pohce
power's ambit, conventionally defined as permissible noncompe� 
satory regulation, simply invalid police power measur�s save m
!
the rare case when government acts in bad faith or m1ures the
landowner in ways that cannot be rectified through noncompensam in
The source of this non sequitur is Justice Holmes' famous aphoris
�roperty
"while
tha
(1922),
415
393,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
[
ion goes
may be regulated to a certain extent under the police power], if regulat
9

too far it will be recognized as a taking."

�
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Second, why must compensation be pegged to the

prohibitively expensive "highest and best use" level i!1 cases � f
overregulation? Is that standard really necessary to msure fair
treatment for the landowner? Isn't it absurd a half century after

Euclid to allow government to reduce land values far below this
level in the run-of-the-mine zoning case but to insist that, should
government seek to deal equitably with the landowner, nothing
less than restoration of the land's value to its highest and best use
will do?

Third, why must compensation be paid in dollars when

government, though often strapped for funds, is in a position to
offer various nondollar trade-offs of palpable economic value?
Fourth, why must government be constrained by eminent do
main's burdensome procedural requirements when the effects of
overregulation can be overcome i n many cases by providing an
appropriate compensatory offset in the regulatory program itself?
Finally, should land's value in disparity disputes be fixed inde
pendently of the landowner's identity or of government's con
tribution to the land's profitability? Should it make a difference,
for example, if the landowner has been the beneficiary of various
public subsidies or if the land has experienced a sharp increase in
value as a result of publicly financed improvements on or near
that land?
III. THE SEARCH FOR A "MIDDLE WAY"
However desirable a middle way between the paths of the police
power and eminent domain may be, determining its precise form
is beset with perils. The primary conceptual issue is whether
sufficient flexibility can be found in the police or eminent domain
powers to locate the alternative within the compass of one or the
other, or, if not, whether recourse must be had to a third power,
intermediate between :the two. But questions must be asked about

the disparity genre as well. Are instances of the genre likely to
recur often enough to warrant the laborious efforts that doctrinal
reform will undoubtedly require? Or are we dealing wi1th a prob

lem peculiar to a limited category of properties such as land
marks? Again, is the nature of the public intervention defining
the genre sufficiently discrete to set it apart from the "true" police
power �nd the "true" minent domain case?
If not, grave equal
:
.
pro tection quest1o
s a�1se. If the genre is merely a variant of the
�
.
police po er, how Justify awarding compe
nsation at all? If a vari
�
ant of eminent domain, how ration
alize a lesser amount of com
.
pensat10n
for the genre landowner than for one whos property
e
has been condemned outright?
T �n there are the practical issue
s of the alternative's ad min
.
istra
bihty. The most stubborn of
these is fixing the amount of

�
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compensation or, as I have labeled it in another essay, the "fair
compensation" 10 due the overregulated landowner. Cases follow
ing Euclid teach that fourteenth amendment objections are stilled
when zoning leaves the landowner with a "reasonable beneficial
use" - that hypothetical residuum of private utility which is a
prerequisite for valid regulation. Presently employed as a thresh
old test to determine whether the police power has been abused,
this standard is also useful in measuring the "fair compensation"
due the overregulated landowner which, by hypothesis, equals the
difference between the land's r easonable beneficial use and the
lower return accruing to it by virtue of the overregulatory meas
ure.11 Applying this standard to individual properties, however,
raises comple x ethical and accounting issues 12

-

both for legis

latures, upon whom the burden falls in the first instance, and for
judges, who must review legislative or administrative determina
tions, or, as a last resort, articulate and apply the standard them
selves.

The burden becomes even more trying if Chief Judge

Breitel's concern for the "social increment" of value is factored
into the equation because it becomes necessary to separate out
the public and private increments of value in the pertinent prop
erty.
Finally, implementation of an alternative requires legislative
and administrative bodies to identify appropriate nondollar trade
offs and to incorporate them into the fair compensation package.
Illustrative is the transferrable development rights

(TDR)

de

vice litigated in Grand Central Terminal.13 In return for retaining
the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central
was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the author
ized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's
designation as a landmark- the rights which would have been
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to coun
tenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neigh
boring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling
Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by con
structing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence
more profitable buildings on the transferee sites.
10
11

See generally Fair Compensation, supra note 6.

For a more detailed explanation of the content and relationship of the co n

cepts of fair comp ensation and reason able beneficial use, as well as a schematization

of other indices of land's economic

value

(including the highest

and best use

standard), see id. at 104g--55.
12

13

See pp. 422-25 infra.
The relevant ordin ances are set forth in NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESO

LUTION art. VII, ch. 4,

§§

74-79 (1971).

For a more extensive account of the

program, see Note, Development Rights Transfer in New
L.J. 338, 349-59 ( 1972).

York

City, 82

YALE

An excellent general bibliography on TDR is DEVELOP

MENT RIGHTS BIBLIOGRAPHY (Rutgers Univ. Leaflet No. 533, 1976).
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Municipal officials and courts reviewing their efforts must con
front an amalgam of economic, planning, and legal questions when

�

dealing with TDR programs or rela ed trade-off� that allocate

bonus building rights as nondollar fair compensation. Are these
rights in fact sufficiently profitable at the user site
the overregulation?

�r sites to cure

Do such schemes undercut rational planning

by introducing "artificial" bulk restrictions and waivers into the
municipal zoning code? Are the benefits that these schemes puta
tively accord the overregulated landowner improperly purchased
at the expense of other landowners in the transfer district who
may be disfavored by the deliberate lowering of de nsity levels to
enhance the transfer rights' marketability or who must contend
with the congestion and other burdens caused by larger-than-nor
mal structures within the transfer district?
A measure of the complexity of the foregoing issues appears
in Chief Judge Breitel's lament in Grand Central Terminal that
judges who attempt to address them
[do ] not pursue a path guided by ample precedent or wholly de
veloped principles.

The area is not merely difficult; it has at

present viewing impenetrable densities.

The last word has not

only not been spoken ; it has hardly been envisaged.14

The judiciary's reluctance to face the issues squarely is largely
due to a breakdown in the national consensus concerning what the
entitlements of private land ownership should be. From the found
ing of the Republic to at least the first third of this century, most
Americans would have agreed that property's functions include
rn
and encouragin g
buffering the individual from state intrusion
efficient, and, for the landowner, profitable exploitation of the na
tion's land resources.16 But neither of these functions commands
universal assent today. Landed property's preeminence in Amer
ican folklore has withered in the face of the nation's urbanization,
the shift in the preponderance of its privately held wealth from
land to personalty, and the emergence of other safeguards against
official caprice. Similarly, ·the imperative that land be exploited
for profit has fared poorly against the telling assault of envir on14

42 N.Y.2d

15

See, e.g., 8

at 337, 336 N.E.2d at 1279, 397 N. Y. S.2 d at 922.
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 426 (J. Boyd ed. r953)
(celebration of the yeoman farmer); Griswold
, Jefferson's Agrarian Democracy, in
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND AMERICAN DEMOCR
ACY 39 (H. Dethloff ed. r97r). See
generally J. LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. 7 (J. Gough ed.
1956) (private property as a check
on monarchica l caprice).
The Euclid decision itself evidences
the depth of support for this function.
D espite the extravagance
- to contemporary eyes - of the Ambler Realty Com·
pa�y's claim, Euclid was resolv ed
6-3, and then only upon rehearing and the
switch of votes by Justice Sutherland
and one other Justice see McCormack,
A Law Clerk's Recollections
, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 710, 712 (194
6 .

1�

)
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mentalists, proponents of growth control, and others who ques
tion centuries-long traditions favoring land's free alienability and
unhindered development.
With the ancien regime fast fading, legislators and judges
have been as befuddled as the rest of us. The former have essen
tially ignored the problem even though they are better equipped
than the courts to take a leadership role in forging a new con
sensus. Without legislative aid, and reluctant to strike out on
their own, the courts have temporized with incanta:tion that de
cides individual cases but leaves untouched the underlying con
flicts that make these cases so troublesome. Faith ful to Hamlet's
perception that we would "rather bear those ills we h ave,/Than
fly to others that we know not of,"

17

both institutions have been

content along with many commentators to acquiesce in the present
system's inadequacies or even to deny their very existence. All the
more extraordinary then is Chief Judge Breitel's resolution of the
Grand Central Terminal controversy.

IV. Grand Central Terminal: THE CONTROVERSY
AND THE DECISION

At stake in the Grand Central Terminal litigation was the
aesthetic integrity of a world-renowned architectural gem.

An

imposing Beaux Arts building whose south facade has been termed
"one of the most stunning achievements in the history of urban
design," 18 the Terminal has landmark qualities beyond dispute.
Setting it apart from other landm arks, however, is the integration
of its base with a comprehensive transit interchange which has
9
substantially increased its value and that of surrounding sites.1
Penn Central attempted to capitalize on the site's prime location
by leasing the air rights above the landmark for construction of
a 59-story office building. A steep annual rental was stipulated
in the lease: one million dollars during the construction p eriod and
a minimum of three million dollars thereafter.20 But the ven:ture
17 W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act Ill,
18

St.

Crock, Depot Loses

J.,

Sept. 13, 1977, at

a

l,

SC.

i, ll. 81--82.

Battle But Preservationists Could Win the War, Wall

col. 4 (quoting Ada Louise Huxtable, New York Times

architecture critic).
19

The intermediate court characterized this feature of the Terminal as follows:

The complete submergence of all the tracks and a double level track system
not only resulted in the accommodation of more trains without the acqui
sition of more land but permitted construction of revenue producing build
ings on air rights owned over the railroad tracks and the development of
Park Avenue as one of the Nation's most prestigious residential communities.
Penn Central Trar.sp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 269, 377 N.Y.S.2d
20, 25 (1975).
20

Id. at 270, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
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was stymied in 1969 when the New York City Landmarks Com
mission, appalled that Penn Central contemplated obliterating
the Terminal's south facade, scorned the proposal as an "esthetic
joke" 21 and refused to grant the requisite appr ovals . Earlier.
anticipating charges of overregulation in its landmarks program:
the city had implemented the TDR scheme described above. Th�
city also hoped that the residual income accruing to Penn Central
from the continued use of the landmark as a transportation ter
minal, from the rentals of its many concessionaires, and from tax
exemptions allowed it over many years, would enable the land
mark program to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Despite the
TDR option and the Terminal's residual income, however, Penn
Central sued for a declaration of the p rogram's invalidity, an in
junction against its enforcement, and compensation for a tempo
rary "taking" during the period from denial of approval to judicial
resolution of the dispute.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the program and
denied compensation.22

In doing so, the court relied in part on

the social increment theory of valuation, finding that public aid
in making the Terminal a major transportation nexus had con
tributed substantially to the site's value.

The court held that

public regulation need not guarantee a reasonable return on "that
ingredient of property value created

_

. . by the accumulated

indirect social and direct governmental investment in the physical
property, its f unctions and surroundings," 23 although it must do
so on value created by the "efforts of the property owner. " 24 The
court also ruled that, in computing the return possible on the
privately created increment of value, the TDR opti on must be
taken into account.25
The Grand Central Terminal controversy fits neatly within
the disparity genre of land use dispute. The proposed develop
ment - an office building - was prohibited not because of its
inherent noxiousness, but because it would displace a use-a
handsome facade - which the city wished to p reserve for indis
putably proper public purposes.

Furthermore, the regulatory

measure - a landmark designation - singled out Penn Central
as owner of the landmark but left its neighbors free to profit from
development under the generous density limits otherwise prevail
ing in the zone. Finally, the public intervention bit hard; Pen n
Central was forced not only to forgo the benefits of a lu crative
21

See Huxtable, Landmarks Are in Trouble with the Law, N.Y. Times, Dec.

§ 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 39, col. 1.
42 N.Y.2d at 328-29, 366 N.E.2d at 1273-74, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916-i7.

22, 1974,
22

23

Id. at 327, 366 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.

2�

Id.

24

Id. at 327, 366 N.E.2d at 1272, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
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lease but to continue operating a facility which, it claimed, en
joyed marginal profitability at best.
Where Grand Central Terminal differs from other litigated
instances of the disparity genre is in the deliberate effort of New
York City to provide nondollar compensation as an offset to its
draconian regulatory program.26

Electing the "middle way" of

TDR, the city neither denied compensation altogether by invok
ing the orthodox police power nor conceded the landowner's en
titlement to the "just compensation" of eminent domain.

The

court of appeals responded to the city's bold initiative with equally
bold efforts of its own, recognizing the centrality of the disparity
issue to the controversy's resolution and commencing the job of
chipping away at that issue's "impenetrable densities."

V. Grand Central Terminal: AN ASSESSMENT
A. Resolution of the Post-Euclidean Anomaly
When the Supreme Court d ecided in Euclid that noncompen
satory public regulation could reduce the market value of private
land without constitutional objection, it left two questions unan
swered. The first was how much reduction in value is permissible,
and the second was what type of compensation is necessary when
regulatio n reduces the value of land below the permissible level.
As Professor Berger has observed, 2; ;the Court itself resolved the
first question one year after Euclid when, in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge,28 it set the standard of reasonable beneficial use. Un
til Grand Central Terminal, however, the courts have been silent
on the second question. Accordingly, it has been assumed that,
if government compensates at all, it must do so on the basis of
the highest and best use standa r d of eminent domain. The bitter
fruit of this reasoning has been the post -Euc lidean anomaly:
while routine zoning regulation may reduce the value of land to
that provided by a reasonable beneficial use, once government
undertakes to compensate it must pay a price based on the ex
treme standard of highest and best use.
26

The one exception to the statement in text is Fred F. French Inv. Co. v.

City of New York (Tudor Parks), 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d

5, appeal dismissed, 4 2 9 U.S. 990 ( 1976), discussed pp. 418-2 l infra, w hich also
entailed a TDR program - there invoked to preserve two privately owned p arks
-and with respect to w hich Chief Judge Breitel also wrote
unanimous court.

an

opinion for a

For examples of litigation dealing with less explicit instances

of the disparity genre, see Fair Compensation, supra note 6, at 1055-60.

27 Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply t o
Professor Costonis, 76 CoLuM. L . REV. 799, 817 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

Reply].
28

277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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Perhaps the single most important contribution of Chief Judge
Breitel's opinion is his resolution o f this anomaly. In square hold
ing, he equated the compensation due when government over
regulates with that necessary to duplicate the reasonable beneficial
use, the standard for valid regulation required by due process in
normal zoning disputes.

His resolution of the anomaly is best

expressed in his own words:
Land use regulation often diminishes the value of property to
the landowners. Cons titutional standards, however, are offended
only when that diminution leaves the owner with no reasonable
use of the property.

The situation with transferable develop

ment rights is analogous.

If the substitute rights received pro

vide reasonable compensation for a landowner forced to relin
quish development rights on a landmark site, there has been no
deprivation of due process. The compensation need not be the
"just compensation" required i n eminent domain, for there has

been no attempt to take the property . . . .

. . . These substitute rights are valuable, and provide sig
nificant, perhaps "fair" compensation for the loss of rights above
the termi n a l itself.29

Two points expressed in this passage merit emphasis. First,
when overregulation, rather than a true "taking," is at issue, the
compensation clause o f the fifth amendment is inapplicable. The
pertinent provision is instead the due process clause of the four
teenth amendment.

Second, the same constitutional standard

reasonable beneficial use - determines the validity of both the
regulation a n d the compensation which must be paid to validate
overregulation.

In either case, the fundamental principle is the

same: rudimentary fairness is required to satisfy the demands of
due process.30
29

42 N.Y. 2d at 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.

3°

Critics

might

object that Chief Judge

Breitel's

reasoning unduly favors

government over the landowner. For example, the critical matter of determining
whether a measure falls into the police power or into the eminent domain box
turns largely o n the regulating government's assumptions at the time it adopts the
measure, not on the actual character of t h e measure's impact at the regulated site.

The eminent domain classification will generally not apply when government be
lieves that a measure constitutes valid regulation either because it falls within the

police power's ambit or because it is attended by an appropriate compensatory
offset. If the regulation is found to be overbroad or the compensation insufficient,
the measure may be invalidated under the fourteenth a mendment; but there is
no condemnation. That the measure may bar virtually any use of the regulated
site as in Tudor Parks, see pp. 418-2 I infra, seems to be ignored. By providing

declaratory relief only, Chief Judge Breitel imposes the expenses of delay and

litigation upon landowners who successfully contest an

overregulatory measure

even though these expenses are directly attributable to the tainted governmental
intervention.

THE
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B. A Bifurcated Police Power
Does the eminent domain, the police, or some third power
provide the constitutional underpinnings for Chief Judge Brei
tel's resolution of the post-Euclidean anomaly?

He clearly ruled

out eminent domain in Grand Central Terminal by denying that
overregulation is

a

"taking" 31 and by insisting that "fair" rather

than "just" compensation is sufficient to save an overregulatory
measure.32 As he put the case:
In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic landmarks
through use of the eminent domain power might be desirable or
even required. But when a less expensive alternative is available,
especially when a city is in financial distress, it should not be
forced to choose between witnessing the demolition of its glorious
past and mortgaging its hopes for the future.

The landmark

preservation provisions of the Administrative Code represent an
effort to take a middle way.33

While the implication that impoverished cities somehow enjoy a
lesser duty to compensate than affluent ones is dubious, Chief
Judge Breitel's general conclusion that the eminent domain route
is inappropriate for disparity genre disputes is not. Highest and
best use awards are neither necessary to insure overregulated land
owners equitable treatment nor financially or procedurally prac

ticable for most local governments.

Chief Judge Breitel's position does tilt in government's favor, though perhaps
not unduly so.

Surely government's assumptions when it regulates are entitled to

great weight in a classification effort.

Government should not be severely penalized

for guessing wrongly in an area so permeated with uncertainty, especially when
the regulatory measures in question are seldom comparable to the outright acqui
sitions traditionally undertaken through eminent domain.

Moreover, even when

regulation approaches confiscation,

compensate may gen

bona fide attempts to

erate the same uncertainty, as subsequent discussion of

See pp. 418-21

infra.

Tudor Parks

points out.

If government abuses the forbearance suggested by Chief

Judge Breitel or acts in an acquisitory mode, judges can always invoke the ex
ception allowing inverse condemnation relief.

Most important of all, Chief Judge

Breitel's position on this issue should not be divorced from his unwavering in
sistence that the landowner receive rudimentary fairness.

If fairness is implemented

through nondollar compensatory offsets, the landowner is given a remedy, albeit
not the expansive remedy of eminent domain.
What I find most troubling in Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning is the unfairness
that arises when, instead of

providing a compensatory supplement, government

chooses to rescind a measure which has been the subject of an adverse judgment
in a declaratory action. In such a case, losses incurred during the interim period
are left with the landowner. Such interim losses, however, may be the price which
must be paid if government is to have the latitude necessary for effective public
regulation.
3 142 N.Y.2d at 329-30, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
32

Id.

at 335-36, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.

33 Id. at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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If eminent domain is ruled out, should the police power, which
in traditional understanding dispenses with compensation entirely

be rejected as well? Although Chief Judge Breitel's position
not entirely clear, his invocation of the standard of reasonable

i�

beneficial use under the fourteenth amendment implies that, for
him , the imperative to compensate the overregulated landowner
does derive from the police power. If this interpretation is cor
rect, Chief Judge Breitel may justly be suspected of pouring new
wine into old bottles.

For the court's resolution of the Grand

Central Terminal controversy differs from judicial resolution of
ordinary zoning disputes by the way in which the reasonable bene
ficial use standard is applied. In the former, conceded overregula
tion is validated by compensation which brings the property's
value up to that standard; in the latter, overregulation is not
deemed to exist at all and hence no compensation is necessary.
Chief Judge Breitel's willingness to pour the new wine of com
pensation into vintage police power bottles was largely determined
by the manner in which he conceptualized the constitutional issue.
He viewed the "middle way" as falling not between the eminent
domain and police powers, but between what he referred to as
the "eminent domain" 34 and the "zoning" powers.35 To arrive at
this characterization, he distinguished the landmark-TDR pro
gram in Grand Central Terminal not from traditional exercises of

the police power but from ordinary zoning regulation.36 Zoning
is distinguishable, he reasoned, because it advances a comprehen

sive community plan which assures orderly development or main
tenance of an area's character and leaves each property owner
in the zone "both benefited and restricted from exploitation, pre

sumably wi>thout discrimination." 37 On the other hand, landmark
designation was seen by Chief Judge Breitel as singling out the
landmark owner for special and disadvantageous treatment. The
landmark owner, he said, "may or may not benefit from the limita
tion but his neighbors most likely will. In contrast both an owner
and his neighbor benefit to some degree and in some manner from
zoning." 38
34

Id. at 330, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917.

35

Id. at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917.

36

Id. at 329-30, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917.

37

Id. at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.

38 Id. at 330, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. Chief Judge Breitel
also observed that landmark restrictions are superficially simila r to invalid spot

zoning measures, which also single out individual properties for severe burdens

or

benefits. Id. at 330, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917. But he noted that,
unlike spot zoning measures, landmark restrictions do not offend equal protection
standards because the distinctive architectural or historic character of landmark

buildings sets them apart from nonlandmark properties, rendering the classification
reasonable. Id. at 330-31, 366 N.E.zd at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.zd at 918. Neverthe less,
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Insofar as his o p i n i o n implies t h a t l andmar k preserv ation does
a comprehe nsive commun i ty plan, C h i e f Judge

not advance

B reitel seems t o have m i sconstrue d the p u rpose o f l andmark
S ur el y they can be rega rded as a compone n t o f such

programs .

plans, one of whose goa l s i ncludes the m a i n te n ance of the desir
able features of the existing urban fabr i c . It i s true, of course,
that lan d m ark res trictions do z e ro in on i n dividual properties
while val i d zon ing measures do n o t .
l ishes that

the

former

a re

B u t this fact merely estab

non z o n i ng

exercises o f the police
power .:1!' not that they u n d e rcut the com m u n i ty's comprehensiv e
planning e fiort.
Elsewhere, I have argued t h a t the police power is an inappro
priate basis for public regul ation-r u m -compensation i n d isparity
genre disputes, suggesting for t h i s purpose a third power - the
"accom modation powe r . " 1 "

I t is u n necessary to repeat the pros

and cons of that argu m e n t here o t h e r t h a n to note th a t the sym
metry of Chief J udge B re i te l ' s eff o r t to d i stinguish the Term inal
dispute from the true e m i nent domain and zoning ge n res would
improve markedly i f the d i stinction offered were that b e tween the

true em inent domain and tru e poliff powrr genres.

\Vhichever

choice is m ad e . i t is c r i t ical to k eep in m i nd that Chief Judge
Breitel's alternatin• cuts both ways :

while i t reduces emi nent

domain's burdens u po n gove rn m e n t by d ispensing with j ust com
pensation , it adds a new req u i re m e n t to the police power i n the
form of fair compensation for d i sparity genre d isputes. Chief

Judge B reitel ' s overr i d i n g concern that the l andowner be fairly
treated evidences his appreciation o f the m iddle way's latter d i 
mension .

B u t w i l l o t h e r s be s i m i l a r l y a l e r t i f the m i d d l e way i s

termed a police power exerc i se ?

C . The Social Incrrmcnt Theory o f Valuation
Among the most daring strokes in Grand Central Terminal
J udge B reitel 's evoc ation o f the ghost o f Henry

was Chief

he warns that the distinctiveness of landmarks provides all the more reason for
court� to be vigilant that due process guarantees are satisfied as well . Id. at 33 1 ,
366 KE.2d at 1 2 7 5 , 3 9 7 N.Y.S . 2 d a t 9 1 8 ; cf. Udell v . Haas, 2 1 N.Y.2 d 463 , 476-78,
on

235 N.E.2d 897, 905-06 ( 1 96 8 ) (discrimin ation in zoning between two parcels
opposite sides of the same road invalidated where not justified by comprehe nsive
plan, as such discrimina tion i s the "opposite side o f the coin, one side of which is
'spot zoning' " ) . Regrettably, the characteristics that make a building a charming
landmark, particularly those of diminutive size and location in downtown areas
.
of high land value, are often the same c h aracteristics that make its retention as

LAND
See J . CosTONis , SPACE ADRIFT: SAVING URBAN
74)
(
1
9
65-88
THROUGH THE CHICAGO PLAN' 6-I I ,
t Domain, and the Preservation of
S
39 ee N'ote , The Police Power, Eminen
Historic Property, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 708, 7 2 2-24 ( 1 963 )

a landmark unprofitable.
MARKS

·

·

•o

See Fair Compensation, supra note 6, at 102 2 .
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in deciding the case in part on the basis o f a sod al incre
.
m ent theory o f valuation . Under that theory t e portion of a
:
property's value that is attributable to public mvestment and
George

41

�

concomitant community growth is excluded from the base upon
which the property's reasonable beneficial use is calculated. After

�e

finding that public enterprise had been vital i n ,

development

and prosperity o f the Terminal, Chief Judge B re1tel stated :

[ T ] he

massive and indistinguishable public, governmental, and

private con tribu tions to a landmark like the Grand Central Ter
minal are inseparably

j oint

. . . . It is exceedingly difficult but

imperative, nevertheless, to sort out the merged ingredients and
to assess the rights and responsibilities of owner and society. A
fair return is to be accorded the owner, but society is to receive
its due for its share in the making of a once great railroad.42

Among the host of public contributions to the Terminal's value
cited by Chief Judge B reitel were subsidies, irrevocable fran
chises, a delegation of the power of eminent domain, tax exemp
tions, and, most important of all, the routing o f various modes of
transit to converge below the Terminal.43
The social increment theory and its underpinnings occupy
many paragraphs of the opinion and will undoubtedly mesmerize
the commentators.

If there ever was a case warranting the the

ory ' s application, Grand Central Terminal is the case. The rough
justice of discounting the Terminal 's rate o f return on the basis
of New York City's active contributions to the profitability of
the Terminal and of Penn Central's nearby holdings is intuitively
appealing. I question, however, whether the theory will prove as
durable or generally useful in the form offered as Chief Judge
Breitel's ()lther grounds for .the decision.
There are two factors cutting against the theory's general ap
plicability. First, it applies only to a small number of properties

- like the Terminal - whose commercial u tility is largely a
consequence of massive public investments at or near the site and
whose owners are the beneficiaries of dramatic infusions of public
largess. Hence, one should read very literally indeed Chief Judge
B reitel's admonition that " Grand Central Terminal is no ordinary

�an?� ark. "

44
Second, the segregation and quantification of an
md1v1dual property's public and p rivate increm
ents of value are
truly formidable tasks, especially when
the respective govern
mental and p rivate contri bution s have
been made continuously

4 1 See H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (
188 1 ) ; H. GEORGE 1 THE LAND

TION

QUES-

( 1 935 ) .
42 N.Y.2 d at 333, 366 N.E.2 d at 1 2 76
, 397 N.Y.S . 2 d at 9 1 9 .
44
a t 3 3 2 , 3 66 N.E.2 d a t 1 2 75-76 , 3 9 7 N.Y.S
. 2 d at 9 1 8- 1 9 .
a t 33 l , 3 6 6 N.E.2 d a t 1 2 75 , 3 9 7 N.Y.S
.2d a t 9 1 8 (emphasis added) .

::

��·
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over a long period.

In this respect, sending attorneys out to de

velop the pertinent data, as Chief Judge Breitel invited the liti
gants to do in Grand Central Terminal,45 is akin to christening a
search for the Holy Grail.
Even granting its general applicability, whether and to what
exitent the social increment theory was essential to the outcome
in Grand Central Terminal is unclear. That it played an influen
tial role in Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning is evident from the
many paragraphs he allotted to i t .

But in concluding that the

return on .the Terminal was reasonable, he cited various other
factors, including its continuing u tility for railroad purposes, the
rentals received from its many concessionaires, its profitability
as the "flagship" o f other nearby Penn Central-owned properties,
and the TD R offset granted Penn Central under New York City's
landmark program.

Indeed, the passage quoted earlier

46

can

fairly be read to imply that the TDR offset alone afforded the
Terminal a return sufficient to meet the minimum requirements
of due process. Although one cannot be sure, it is a good guess
that future courts, reluctant to b ecome ensnared in the quixotic
task of segregating a site's public and private increments o f
value, will choose to view one or a combination of these later-cited
factors as furnishing the basis of the decision in Grand Central

Terminal.
Where Chief Judge Breitel's innovative reasoning is likely to
prove productive, however, is in its implicit support for public
measures that seek partial recapture of private property's social
increment of value to finance community amenities . In an earlier
opinion, Chief Judge Breitel hinted at this possibility by suggest
ing tha;t "assessments for public benefit" may ease the disparity
dilemma provided that the courts are willing to sanction " an ex
pansion of the traditional views with respect to what are assess
able public benefits." 47
TDR schemes aptly illustra;te the point. Recall the objection
that TDR programs "artificially" restrict general zoning den
sities within transfer districts in order to c reate a market for
transferable rights. Under the theory expounded by Chief Judge
Breitel, however, is not the "social increment of value" of prop
erties within the transfer district p roperly " assessable" by gov
ernment in aid of legitimate planning objectives? And if the re
duction in value of these properties under a TDR p rogram i s
marginal (as i s the case under virtually all T D R propos als i n the
4�

Id. at 337, 366 N.E.2d at 12 79, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 92 2 .
supra.
47 Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York ( Tudor Parks ) , 39 N.Y.2d
5 87, 599, 350 N.E.2d 381, 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 1 1 2-13, appeal dismissed, 4 2 9 U.S.
46 See p . 412

990 (1976).
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than thei r socia l increme nt
United States 48) , and ther efore less
deem ed a valid gove rnment
of value cannot the redu ction be
inal' s two majo r analytic
assessme t ? I f so, Grand Cent ral Term
incre ment of value theory
strands - its acceptance o f the socia l
's in affor in g fair com
and its recognition of the role of TDR
_
te their mdependert
pensation - are mutually reinf orcin g despi
development in the opinio n .49

�

�

D. T DR in the Courts

Chief Judge Breitel sustained the facial validity of TDR's as
compensation both in Grand Central Terminal and in an earlier
opinion, Fred F . French Investing Co. v. City of New York
( Tudor Parks )

.50

Agreeing that development rights may be sep

arated from their host parcel and transferred to other sites, he
confirmed that these rights are an essential part o f the host par
cel's value and "may not be disregarded in determining whether
the [planning regulations have] destroyed the economic value of
the underlying property. " 0 1 In strong dictum in Tudor Parks,
moreover, he endorsed the establishment of municipal develop
ment rights banks - institutions empowered to condemn and re
sell development rights - as a supplement to purely private trad
ing in the rights."2 Finally, in Grand Central Terminal, he held
that development rights may serve as the nondollar compensation
required to bring the return on overregulated property up to the
reasonable beneficial use standard. To Penn Central's contention
that the development rights i t received might h ave a lesser value
at the transferee sites than at the Terminal, Chief Judge Breitel
responded that a loss in value at the transferee site does not of it48

Brief accounts of many of the variants of the TDR device can be foun d in

OF LAND USE REGU
LATION ( J . Rose ed. I975 ) . To b e contrasted with the modest American approach is
that proposed in Brazil, under which landowners would be required to purchase

THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS : A NEW TECHNIQUE

from government all rights in excess of those that could be incorporated into
one-story structure covering the owner's entire lot.

a

See de Azevedo, de Ambrosis

& do Valle Nogueira, 0 "Solo Criado," C.J. ARQUITETURA, No. 16, at 9 ( 1977) .
The proposal is included in a national land use bill (Anteprojeto da Lei de Desen
volvimento Urban o ) now under discussion by Brazilian n ational officials. The bill
is reproduced in id. at 26.
49 This argument is developed in greater
detail in Fair C ompensation, supra
note 6, at 1 032-3 3 , and in Costonis, Development Rights
Transfer: A n Exploratory

Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 , 97-9 9 , 1 0 7-1 7 ( 973 .
1
)
. so
39 N.Y.2d 5 8 7 , 350 N.E.2 d 3 8 1 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 , appeal
dismissed, 4 2 9 U.S.
990 ( 1 976 ) .

:� 3 9 N.Y.2d at 5 97 , 350 N . E . 2 d at 3 8 7 , 3 85 N.Y.S.2 d at

1r.
Id. t 5 98-99, 3 5 0 N.E . 2 d at 3 88, 3 85 N.Y.S.2d
at 1 2 . For a TDR proposal
�
.
mcorporatmg a municipal bank, see
J. CosTONIS, supra note 3 8 , ch . 2 .
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self mean "that the substitution of rights amounts to a deprivation
of property without due process of law" as long as " th e substitute
rights received provide reasonable compensation for a landowner
forced to relinquish development rights on a landmark site."

r.:i

Despite Chief Judge Breitel' s general endorsement of TDR
programs, it would be a grave error to conclude that specific TDR
progr ams are immune from judicial invalidation as applied. In
fact, the New York C ourt of Appeals struck down the Tudor
Parks TD R program, under which New York City attempted to

preserve two privately owned parks in the Tudor City complex
on M anhattan' s East Side by p recluding development on them
altogether but making their development rights transferable to
a district located elsewhere on the East Side. 5 1

Citing the pro

gram's "mandatory" and "contingency-ridden" character, Chief
Judge Breitel, writing for a unanimous court, castigated it as
having created "floating development rights, utterly unusable
until they could be attached to some accommodating real prop
erty, available by happenstance of prior ownership, or by grant,
purchase, or devise, and subject to the contingent app rovals of ad
ministrative agencies." 55 In contrast, he later app roved the Grand
Central Terminal program ostensibly because the rights there were

transferable to a variety of neighboring sites (several of which
Penn Central owned ) ,56 because the rights could be split between
different transferee sites, and because Penn Central itself had pre
viously considered transferring a portion of the rights to two
neighboring sites it owned.57
Chief Judge Breitel's stated grounds for distinguishing the
two TDR programs are neither convincing nor helpful to mu

nicip al officials who wish to design a TDR program that will pass
muster. In truth, the administrative contingencies of both pro

gram s were essentially the same. Moreover, both programs were
mandatory in effect, both authorized the splitting of developme nt
rights, and both offered transfer districts which contained numer

ous sites suitable for developm ent of the type desired. Indeed,
the transfer rights in Tudor Parks were potentially more valua le
than those in Grand Central Termin al because the transfer dis
trict was much larger and enjoyed median land values twice those

�

'3 42 N.Y.2d at 3 3 5 , 366 N.E.2d at 1 2 7 8, 3 9 7 N.Y.S.2d at 9 2 1 .

�4 For a n especi ally well-informed account of the Tudor Parks TDR program,
see Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause : The

Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77, 79-85 ( r 974 ) .
5'
'6

39 N.Y.2d at 5 97-98, 3 5 0 N.E.2d at 388, 3 8 5 N.Y.S.2d at 1 1 .
42 N.Y.2d at 334, 3 6 6 N.E.2d at 1 2 7 7, 3 9 7 N.Y . S . 2 d at 920 ·

'7 Id.

at 335, 366 N.E.2d at 1 2 7 7 , 397 N.Y.S.2d at 9 2 1 .
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of the parks themselves.58 Finally, the Tudor Parks developer,
like Penn Central, had at one time unsuccessfully sought per
mission from the city to transfer its rights 59 and, after �e en
actment of the pertinent TDR program, had actually received a
"substantial offer" 60 for those rights. The two situations differed
only in that the Tudor Parks owner, although a leading New
York City realtor-developer, apparently did not itself own land
within the transfer district. While this difference may have made
sale or use of the rights somewhat more problematic, it hardly
negated their value, as evidenced by the "substantial offer" that
the developer received for them.
How then can one explain the differing outcomes in these
cases ? Perhaps the difference is that in Tudor Parks no residual
return whatever was possible once the parks had been downzoned,
while in Grand Central Terminal a significant return accrued to
the restricted site. In the latter instance, therefore, the role of
the TDR's was to supplement an existing return, while in Tudor
Parks they afforded the only possibility of return. One might
take this reasoning a step further by asking whether Tudor Parks
is a disparity genre dispute at all. It could be that the court
perceived the Tudor Parks scheme as invading the landowner's
entitlements so drastically that the court would have been satis
fied with nothing short of .the city's use of its eminent domain
power to acquire ;the parks outright. After all, the city did down
zone the parks to zero density; further, it insisted that the de
veloper open them to the public and maintain them at its own
expense.61
A second rationale may be ventured which is also rooted in
the court's skepticism about the marketability of the Tudor Parks
development rights. Read broadly, Grand Central Terminal and
Tudor Parks passed judgment on three types of TDR programs 
one employing a municipal development rights bank to purchase
or condemn rights from the restricted landowner (approved in
dictu?1 i � Tudor Parks) , a second authorizing the owner to trans
fer his nghts to a nearby site also owned by him ( approved in
58

S e e Marcus, supra note 54, a t 83-84
.
Earlier, the developer had requested permission to transfer the TDR's to a
bui lding that it proposed to construct on a platform over Forty-Second Street
.
.
This request was denied on urban design grounds. See id. at
81.
59

60

61

Id. at 84 n .2 2 .

.
. h the two
T o d"1stmgu15
programs on this basis, however, assumes a point
that regre tably was not argued or discussed in the
Tudor Parks litigation - that
he park sites could be viewed as isolated economi
cally from the Tudor City build
_ g
mgs s rroundin
them. If the parks and surrounding building
s had been viewed
as an integrated architectural
and economic complex as they obviously had been
when constructed initially, the facts
in Tudor Parks
ould have been substantially
analogous to those in Grand Centr
al Terminal.

�

�

�

�
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Grand C entral Terminal) ,

and a third requirin g transfer of the
rights to a district located some distance from the restricted prop
erty and lacking the common ownership feature of the second
(invalidated in Tudor Parks) . Perhaps Ch ief Judge Breitel's
message to municipal planning authoriti es is that he is willing to
restrain his doubts about the economic utility of development
rights in the first two instances, but not in the third. I f so, Chief
Judge Breitel's reasoning deserves the closest scrutiny because
the great majority of current and proposed TDR programs are
of the third type.
To distinguish between TDR programs on the basis of the
transferor's ownership of sites in the transfer district would be
to resolve a complex economic and factual problem by legal fiat.
The value of TDR's depends upon the totality of circumstances
surrounding the individual TDR program. Undoubtedly, TDR
programs involving area-wide transfers can be conceived that are
so out of line with the realities of the real estate market that the
purported recompense offered the restricted owner is mythical
at best. But, as empirical studies undertaken by this writer and
others confirm, it is no less conceivable that these programs can
provide substantial recompense and, more to the point, that the
rights made transferable under them will in most cases pro ve
more valuable than rights made transferable only t o adjacent

Indeed, findings of precisely this nature explain why the
Chicago Plan,63 a proposal for the preservation o f landmark
buildings in that city, abandoned the adjacency limitation of the
Grand Central Terminal TDR program in favor of area-wide
transfers.64 It would be ironic indeed if this modification, under
taken to enhance the marketability of development rights! were
to prove the undoing of a TDR p rogram on the ground that area
wide transfers, as a matter of law, undermine the program's eco
nomic credib ility.

sites.62

62 See,
e.g., J. CoSTONIS, supra note 3 8 , at 48-5 1 , 54-56, 5 9-60, 1o7-o8 ; J .
CosTONIS & J . SHLAEs, DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS : A SOLUTION TO C111CAGO's LANDMARKS DILEMMA 3-7, 16-19 ( Chicago Cha p te r Foundation A . I .A . &
Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation 1 9 7 1 ) ; cf. J . CosToNIS & R. DEVov, T n E

PUERTO Rico PLAN: ENVIRON MENTAL P ROTECTION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
TRANSFER, PART III ( Conservation Trust o f Puerto Rico & Urban Land Instit te
1 975) (recommending transfer of development rights to designated tran fer dis
tricts anywhere on the island, whose zoning and planning controls are designed to
create a favorable market for the transfer able rights ) . More general sup p ort for
the proposition in text can be found in the 25 econom ic analyses o f TDR's cited

�

�

in DEVELOPMENTS RIGHTS BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 1 3 .
.
°1
63 S
ee C ostonis, The Chicago Plan : Incentiv e Zoning and the Preserva tion
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV . L. REV. 5 74 ( 197 2 )
·

64 Id. at 5 78, 5 84-8 9 .
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E. R e asonable Beneficial Use : A n Ethical Standard
or an A ccounting Rule ?
Conspicuously absent from Grand Central Terminal is any
attempt to reduce to dollars the Terminal's value in its reasonable
beneficial use, its value when overregulated, or the value of Penn
Central's d evelopment rights.

A t first blush, the omissions are

puzzling both because these economic indices are basic to Chief
Judge Bre i tel's conceptualization o f the disparity issue and be
cause the New York City landmark ordinance provides an ex
plicit quantitative standard by equating the reasonable beneficial
use of a p rivately owned landmark with a six percent return on
its assessed valuation.65 However, the omissions are explained by
the fact tha t the proceedings never reached the stage at which
an attemp t at valuation would have been appropriate. While the
opinion sustained the landmark designation, i t also granted leave
to the parties to develop evidence bearing on the applicability of
the social increment theory to the controversy.66 Without this
evidence to measure how much o f the Terminal's value should be
excluded f rom the base for calculating its reasonable beneficial
use, application o f the foregoing indices in a more concrete man
ner was impossible.67
In future litigation, however, an undertaking of this nature
will confront courts that accept Chief Judge B reitel's formulation
of the disparity issue . Some commentators are skeptical that the
courts can do the job.

Professor B erger, for example, con fesses

to having "little faith that the courts can establish workable rules
that would readily distinguish the vaguely compensable from the
vaguely noncompensable situations." 68
65
66
67

N.Y.

See

CITY ADMIN. CODE ANN.

ch.

8A, §

Indeed, he calls into

2 0 7- 1 .o ( v ) ( Williams 1976) .

42 N.Y. 2d at 3 3 7 , 366 N.E.2d at 1 2 79, 3 9 7 N.Y.S.2d at 92 2 .

There is a n additional reason that C h i e f Judge B reitel may have felt it un

necessary to quantify the pertinent indices of value - a reason of a more theo
retical character .

The TDR program in Grand Central Terminal was designed to

afford Penn Central an opportunity for economic return equal to or greater tha n
that it would have had absent the restriction.

It did so by allowing Penn Central

to transfer the full equivalent of its unused development rights to parcels with a
value roughly equivalent to that of the Terminal site.

If we assume that the

reasonable beneficial use of the Terminal site could have been set at a lower level
than its profit potential prior to the Terminal's designation

as

a landmark and

that the transfer rights would in fact bring a price roughly equivalent to their
value at the Terminal site, the TDR program would afford Penn Central a sub
stantially greater return than the fourteenth amendment demands.

Under this

reasoning, it was not inappropriate for Chief Judge B r eitel to have disdained the
fine tuning effort entailed in quantifying values for the various indices and to
have engaged instead in a more general inquiry into the transfer rights' overall
utility to Penn Central.
68

Reply , supra note 2 7 , at 821.
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question the capacity o f l egislatures to do so 69 �av e in the �ase ?f
.
"operating p roperties" such as apartment bmldmgs, which, m
the context o f rent control schemes or landmark designations, are
entitled to a six percent return o n assessed valuation under New
York City ordinances.7°

For Professor Berger, computation of

the value o f a property's reasonable beneficial use turns on two
variables - the property's investment base and its rate of re
turn.71

Excepting the case of operating properties, h e believes

that the efforts to "predicate a fair return or to establish an in
vestment base create difficulties defying solution ," because the
base value depends on the return and the fair return depends
upon the base.'� To avoid this circularity, he u r ges what he terms
the "balancing process - public
ment"

73

benefit versus private detri

as a more generally useful approach to resolving the

constitutional issues posed by overregulation.
Whether the courts - or legislatures - can and will rise to
the task of fine-tuning the standards of fair compensation has yet
to be tested because judicial recognition of their emergence as an
issue is original to Grand Central Terminal.

Full treatment of

the problem and of Professor Berger's discerning critique
the "middle way" discussed in this and an earlier essay

75

74

of

of mine

is impossible here, but three general observations can be offered .
First, the constitutional standard o f reasonable beneficial use which must now be applied in New York whenever a landowner
complains of overregulation - is essentially a standard for ju
dicial review of legislative and administrative p rograms for com
pensation ; it is not a substitute for those programs. Second, as a
standard rather than a rule, reasonable beneficial use demarcates
a threshold of fairness and does not purport to provide a quanti
tative measure of value.
69
70

71

12
73
74

Consequently, mathematical precision

Id. at 8 1 8-19.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 8 1 9 .
Id. at 8 2 3 .
M y praise for Professor Berger's critique i s not offered perfunctorily.

of the zoning game's most tough-minded and

One

astute commentators, Berger has

penned a critique that merits the closest scrutiny of legislators, judges, and com
mentators who wish seriously to address the disparity issue.
the inability of legislators and j udges to

If he is correct about

do the fine tuning called for in this

essay, his critique severely undermines the utility of this analysis.

As I see it, the

basic differences between Berger and myself are my relatively greater optimism on
the possibility of fine tuning and my conviction that legislators and courts must
be forced to the test if a suitable replacement is to emerge for the former, nearly
defunct consensus in America concerning landed property's entitlements.
408-09

supra.

unfortunate counsel, at least in disparity genre disputes.
75

See

pp.

It is for this reason that I view relapse to the "balancing test" as

See generally Fair Compensation, supra

note 6.

See

pp. 42 5-26

infra.
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is not required of the judiciary in applying the reasonable bene
ficial use standard. Nor is mathematical precision necessary to
improve existing land use jurisprudence. The constitutional stand
ard developed in Grand Central Terminal will insure that thought
ful attention is paid to the claims of the landowner concerning
the impac t of regulation on his parcel's capacity to earn a reas on 

able return , and that the role o f nondollar c ompensation in miti

gating overregulation is intelligently appraised in terms of its
economic credibility and its status under a reformulated police
power. Both steps will mark a welcome advance over .the impres
sioni"stic opinions that flaw the current jurisprudence.
A final observation, implicit i n the first two, is that reasonable
beneficial use is primarily an ethical standard despite its rendition
in the syntax of the accountant.

Community values and the re

quirement of fundamental fairness for the landowner determine

whether the standard should b e employed at all - it obviously
has no role where the proscribed land use i s a nuisance - and, if
so, the level of the "threshold" o f fairness. The great majority of
land use d isputes involve little more than the prevention of harm
ful externalities and should therefore continue to be resolved
under traditional police power principles.

In the disparity genre

case, where o.ther considerations predominate, the fourteenth
amendment standard is necessary to insure fair treatment both
for the overregulated landowner and, let it not be forgotte n,
for the regulatory authority

as

well.

Although reasonable benefi cial use functions as a standard in

the judici ary's hands, it must be translated into more concrete
form - through quantification o r otherwise - by legislatures that
implemen t c ompensatory programs. These legislative efforts too

are ultimately founded on ethical considerations rather than on
those of a neutral accounting n ature. In fact, the vicious circle
involving investment base and fair return that so vexes Professo r
Berger c a n be resolved only by a prior value judgment that affords
the predicate for subsequent accounting calculations.

For in

stance, New York City's six percent figure for the return on land
marks and rent-controlled buildings - which Professor Berger
apparently

approves - is not

divinely ·preordained.

Forceful

arguments can undoubtedly be made for setting it at five or eight
percent.

Realistically perceived, the six percent rate is nothing
more or less than the outcome o f the familiar legislative proc ess
of compromise of competing interests, in which the ethical valu es
of the public decisionmaker play a dominant role.

Why shouldn't a similar process b e appropriate to apply th e

reasonable beneficial use standard to various categories of non
operating properties as well ?

The answer surely does not lie in
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the circularity objection becaus e , as the example o f New York
City's six percent rule illustrates , circularity yields to the tug and
pull of the legislative process.

The difficulties lie rather in the

confusion concerning what this society 's bottom-line perception
of landed

property's entitlemen ts should be.

This Comment

urges that legislatures, not the courts, take the leading role in
resolving the disparity issue because, whatever their

failings,

legislatures are better equipped than the courts b o th to seek
consensus on this complex and controversial issue and to prescribe
rules implementing the reasonable beneficial use standard for
particular categories of regulated properties.

The judiciary's

task, under the constitutionally mandated standard, is to decide
whether the rules that legislatures fix fall within this standard's
ambit.
Contrary to Professor Berger ' s viewpoint, therefore, approval
of Chief Judge Breitel's reasoning does not commit one to the
view that the reasonable beneficial use standard is a "philosopher's
stone"

76

that "dos [es] out the controversy over the bounds of

the regulatory power"

77

or that it will make "simpler"

lishment of priorities among ethical values.

78

estab

But the reasonable

beneficial use standard and the other determinants of value cited
by Chief Judge Breitel as establishing a context for dealing pro
ductively with the disparity issue do illuminate the sources o f the
current impasse and contribute significantly to its resolution. No
less importantly, Chief Judge B reitel' s approval of those deter
minants signals the judiciary's willingness to accord legislatures
significant latitude in prescribin g the nature of the compensation
due overregulated landowners.

While there are many uncertain

ties attending such prescriptive efforts, particular rules for com
pensation are unlikely to prove objectionable to the j udiciary so
long as they are responsibly implemented and the compensation
they provide is fair under the f o urteenth amendment.
Effor:ts of this nature, in my view, are superior to the '1balanc
ing process" as a basis for resolving disparity genre disputes. As

Grand Central Terminal so forcefully illustrates, there are cases
in which the public benefits in question are priceless b u t the im
pact of noncompensatory regulation on the landowner devastating.
What is gained by ((balancing" in such instances? The suggestion
flatly abandons fairness as the fulcrum of decision, substituting
for it the all-or-nothing approach that created the impasse in the
first place. Moreover, whatever the problems of administering the
reasonable beneficial use standard, the balancing test is incom-

Reply, supra
Id. at 8 2 1 .
7 8 Id. at 823.
76
77

note 27,

at

816.
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parably m o r e open-ended.

[Vol. 9 1 : 40 2

Assuming that t h e pertinent factors

can be isolated, the test tells us nothing about the relative weight
that should be assigned to each, let alone how conflicts among
them should be resolved .
On this issue as on the many other questions discussed in this
Comment, Chief Judge Breitel has given us inventive and, in my
view, strikingly useful assistance.

He is surely correct that on

these matters " the last word has not . . . been spoken . "

But he

is altogether too humble in suggesting that "it has hardly been
envisaged ."

